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Abstract. The paper investigates the relationship between Croatian local government 
budget outturns (i.e., fiscal success) and a chosen set of economic and non-economic 
determinants. The determinants are divided into four groups: (i) economic, (ii) political, 
(iii) transparency and (iv) socio-historical. Three main goals are set in the paper. The first 
is to determine whether there are differences in fiscal success at the different levels of 
administrative governance (counties, cities and municipalities) in Croatia. Subsequently, 
the second goal is determining whether such differences are of an economic or non-
economic origin and third, whether such differences are robust, meaning do they persist 
at all three administrative levels. If the differences are not persistent, the question remains 
as towards what determinants (economic or non-economic) do they diverge. The analysis 
is conducted on the entire population, i.e. 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties 
for the period 2012–2014. Panel data and regression analysis are applied to study the 
differences and signs of independent variables. The obtained results indicate that 
differences between local government units in Croatia stem are of an economic and political 
origin. 
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The main issues typically emphasized in the on-going debate on Croatian regional 
development are the large number of local government units (LGUs), the 
overlapping of their functions and responsibilities‡ as well as limited fiscal capacity 
                                                 
† Corresponding author 
‡ Yilmaz and Guner [24] point out the necessity of a clear framework that describes the roles and 
responsibilities of different levels of government. Otherwise, the division of roles and responsibilities may 
become a potential source of tension and confusion in decentralization.  
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([15] and [10]). The general thought in literature on local government is that these 
issues may lead to a lack of fiscal responsibility, inefficiencies and consequently 
lower fiscal success of LGUs ([2] and [15]). In view of the current lack of fiscal 
success of Croatian LGUs, the literature concludes that it is a direct consequence 
of inadequate decentralization processes carried out in the 1990s that resulted in 
local budgets having first and foremost a social and political and not economic 
function. This in return resulted in their pro-cyclical effect during business cycles 
that jeopardized the stabilizing function of public finances ([12], [13] and [14]).  
Accordingly, the main motivation in this paper is a holistic approach to fiscal 
determinants in regional and local government levels in Croatia. Thus, this paper 
takes a closer look at the relationship between Croatian local government budget 
outturns (i.e., fiscal success) and selected economic and non-economic determi-
nants. Three main goals are set out in the paper: (1) to determine whether there 
are differences in fiscal success at different levels of administrative governance 
(counties, cities and municipalities) in Croatia; (2) to determine whether such 
differences have an economic or non-economic origin, and (3) whether such 
differences are robust, meaning do they persist at all three administrative levels. 
If the differences are not persistent, the question is as in what determinants 
(economic or non-economic) do they diverge. Methodology based on panel data 
and regression analysis are applied in order to study the differences and signs of 
the independent variables. 
Given that empirical literature on the fiscal success of Croatian LGUs is limited, 
this research contributes to a better understanding of determinants involved in 
fiscal success by combining two branches of literature, i.e., economic and political. 
Consequently, it provides new insight into the fundamental issue, i.e. the fiscal 
success in local public finances and regional economics. Keeping that in mind, the 
determinants are divided into four distinct groups of variables: (i) economic, (ii) 
political, (iii) transparency and (iv) socio-historical. The analysis is conducted for 
all three levels of LGUs, i.e., 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties during 
the period 2012–2014 and involves the (i) economic, (ii) political (iii) transparency 
and (iv) socio-historical components.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The current state of local 
government units and a rationale for the selecting the particular variables are 
explained in the second section. In section three, existing empirical research is 
explained. The fourth section discusses the utilized data set, while the fifth section 
provides an overview of the methodology. The main empirical results and their 
implications for the fiscal success of the LGUs are elaborated in the sixth section. 
And finally, the main conclusions of the conducted research are summarized in 
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2. Local and regional governments in Croatia  
 
Croatia is a small and fiscally centralized country, divided into an excessive 
number of regional and local government units. Currently, it is divided into three 
administrative levels. Namely, it has 20 counties plus the City of Zagreb which, 
as the capital city, has special status. These 21 units represent the regional 
government. However, the counties are further divided into 428 municipalities 
and 128 cities which represent local governments. 
Each regional and local unit manages its own budget which is approved by the 
regional or local council. Since the local elections in 2009, county and municipality 
heads and mayors are elected directly by voters and have the power to formulate 
and send their budgets to regional and local councils for approval. Therefore, 
regional and local councils may reject a proposed budget. However, in that case, 
the local or regional unit in question calls for early elections. Hence, first political 
variable selected in this paper is the ideological stance of an incumbent – mayor, 
county or municipality head since they are the most important figure in the 
budget process.  
The revenue and expenditure side of the budget is recorded in manner similar to 
the national budget. Based on economic classification, the expenditure side of the 
budget is mostly concentrated on material costs and salaries as well as on other 
expenditures§, while the functional classification indicates that public revenues go 
mostly towards general public services, transport, communication and education 
[23]. The revenue side of the budget is divided into tax revenue, non-tax revenue, 
capital revenue and grants. Given that Croatia is a textbook example of a fiscally 
centralised country ([3] and [23]), the majority of the local government revenue 
comes from income tax which is a common tax shared between the central 
government and cities and municipalities. Moreover, both regional and local 
governments have their own tax revenues (e.g. surtax, real estate commerce tax, 
etc.) which together constitute the majority of their revenue. For that reason, this 
article focuses on tax revenues to examine their impact on the fiscal success of 
local and regional units.  
With respect to high fiscal centralization, special emphasis was given to grants 
from the central government to regional and local units due to vaguely defined 
economic and but clear political criteria [20]. Existing economic regional 
imbalances in Croatia have been already empirically investigated and they all po-
int to a high vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal fiscal inequalities. These 
findings emphasize the need for clearer economic criteria and a focus on vertical 
as well as horizontal equilibrium ([3] and [23]). Closely connected is the question 
of indebtedness of local and regional units in Croatia, which also represents one 
                                                 
§ The negative relationship between the budget transparency and the higher the share of other expenditures 
is often highlighted in the literature. 
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of the variables in the empirical part of this paper. Existing legislation [25] obliges 
regional and local level to seek for approval from the Ministry of Finance in case 
of any credit or bond obligations and puts cumulative constraints on all regional 
and local governments. But there seems to be a moral hazard problem in this, due 
to the fact that the central government guarantees for their debts, hence local 
and regional units circumvent these constraints in various ways. 
 
3. Literature review 
 
To date, empirical literature on the fiscal success of Croatian LGUs is limited. 
Existing empirical research has focused mainly on municipalities and cities and, 
to the authors’ knowledge, there has not been a single paper that has simultane-
ously examined all three levels of administrative governance in Croatia. 
Rašić Bakarić et al. [22] analysed factors that influence economic success of 
Croatian cities. The authors found that among factors that determine differences 
in economic success are the size of the cities, the distribution of cities into larger 
regional units (e.g. cities in the northwestern part of Croatia exhibit better results 
compared to cities in other regions) and the dominant political party in a city. 
The same authors conducted a similar study for Croatian municipalities [21] and 
concluded that large municipalities have a higher fiscal capacity. The authors 
recommend a more cost effective and fiscally sustainable administrative division 
and the enlargement of current municipalities. Furthermore, a mayor’s political 
affiliation is directly related to differences in the relative amount of aid granted 
from the central government budget. Jurlina Alibegović and Slijepčević [11] inve-
stigated the possibilities for measuring the performance of LGUs. The authors 
identified that one of the main obstacles for regional development is a significant 
divergence of budgetary outturns from the originally approved budget, both on 
the revenue and expenditure side of the budget. 
On the international level, Ashwort et al. [1] analysed 28 countries from 1976 to 
2000 and found that the amount of revenue raised by sub-national governments 
leads to a long-term fall in the size of government. However, grants have the 
opposite effect. In addition, the authors found evidence that greater 
decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending. On the other 
hand, on a panel of 17 OECD countries over the period from 1975 to 2001, 
Baskaran [5] reports that expenditure decentralization significantly reduces public 
indebtedness, whereas tax decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalances are 
statistically insignificant. 
Using budget data from a panel of 47 US states for the period 1970-1991, Bohn 
and Inman [6] found that balance requirements enforced as constitutional 
constraints by an independently elected (not politically appointed) state supreme 
court have significant positive effects on a state’s general fund surplus. Similar 
results relating to fiscal constraints on the budget balance were confirmed by Feld 
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and Kirchgassner [7] using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. 
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that direct democracy leads to signify-
cantly lower expenditure and revenue. Additionally, cantonal as well as local 
expenditure and revenue are lower, the higher the share of local expenditure. The 
impact of he ideology of incumbents on the size of US state government between 
1950 and 1997 was empirically tested by Pickering and Rockey [19]. The authors 
report that the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of 
state government size. Namely, a one standard deviation move towards the left 
of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard 
deviation. 
 
4. Data  
 
The paper uses three distinct datasets:  
1. a dataset that consists of a cross-section of Croatian counties ( 20) for 
the period from 2012 to 2014 ( 3), 
2. a cross-section of Croatian cities N=128 ( 128) for the period from 
2012 to 2014 ( 3), and 
3. a cross-section of Croatian municipalities ( 428) for the period from 
2012 to 2014 ( 3).  
All datasets employ the same set of variables and the data on these variables were 
obtained from various sources. The dependent variable, fiscal success (FS) was 
defined as a ratio of budget surplus/deficit and total revenues and is therefore 
expressed in per cent of total revenue of the local government. Data on budget 
surplus/deficit and total revenues of the local government were obtained from the 
Ministry of Finance. The determinants of fiscal success (independent variables) 
are divided into four groups. The first group consists of economic variables: share 
of tax revenues in total revenues (TAX); debt level (DEBT) measured as debt 
per capita in national currency (HRK), and deflated by the harmonised index of 
consumer prices (HICP), 2015=100; and share of grants in total revenue 
(GRANTS). Data on tax revenues, debt level and grants were obtained from the 
Financial Agency (FINA), while the HICP series were obtained from Eurostat. 
The second group of independent variables contains political variables that 
describe political affiliation of the mayor labelled as ideo_l and ideo_r. The 
variables are defined as dummy variables that take on the value of one if a mayor 
supports left wing parties (ideo_l) or right wing parties (ideo_r), respectively, 
and zero otherwise. Coinciding (“matching”) of political affiliation at the local 
and central government level (variable MATCH) is defined as a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of one if the political affiliations at the local and central 
government level coincide. Data for the political variables are taken from State 
Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia.  
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The third group (transparency) includes only one independent variable: the 
citizens’ budget (CB), defined as a dummy variable that takes on the value of one 
if the local government unit issues a budget guide or similar simplified form of a 
budget document aimed at clarifying the local budget process to its inhabitants. 
The source for these data is the Institute of Public Finance.  
And finally, in the fourth group, as a representative of socio-historical variables, 
the variable war affected areas (WA) was analysed. WA is measured as the 
number of war veterans with disability for every 1000 inhabitants. The relevant 
data were obtained from Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS).  
 
5. Methodology  
 
Limited by the availability of data, the analysis was based on two different 
empirical models. The impact of economic and political determinants on fiscal 
success was studied using a panel methodology. Given that the analysis is 
performed on the entire population, i.e. 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 
counties, and the conclusions are drawn from the entire population, the panel 
fixed effects model is the preferred model [9]. The model is defined as 
 
 ,,1,,,1   ,,,, TtNiuXy titiiti    (1) 
 
where yi,t is the dependent variable, i.e., fiscal success, Xi,t  is a matrix of selected 
economic and political determinants,  is a matrix of coefficients and i is a group-
specific constant term that captures (individual) heterogeneity for each group. ui,t  
is the error term.  
Matrix Xi,t comprises economic variables (TAX, DEBT, GRANTS), political 
variables (ideo_l, ideo_r and MATCH) and an interaction term: 
GRANTS_MATCH. Inclusion of the interaction term as an additional regressor, 
enables analysing if the relationship between GRANTS and FS depends on 
compliance of political affiliations at the local and central government level. 
For selecting the appropriate panel model, two tests were applied: the F-test for 
poolability and the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for random 
effects. The F-test for poolability (F-test for Fixed Effects) is performed to verify 
if individual (group-specific) effects exist. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the 
conclusion is that there is a significant fixed effect, i.e. that the fixed effect model 
is preferred to the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model.  
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test examines if any random effect 
exists. The null hypothesis is that the error variance components are zero. If the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, the pooled OLS model is preferred. Otherwise, the 
random effect model outperforms the pooled OLS. 
 
                          What determines the fiscal success at a local level?                          289 
 
As a result of model specification tests, the pooled OLS model proved to be the 
adequate model for all local government units (counties, municipalities and 
cities)**, i.e., for all LGUs we imposed restrictions on model (1) where  = i for 
all i = 1,…,N and estimated the pooled OLS model 
 
 ,,1,,,1   ,,,, TtNiuXy tititi    . (2) 
 
When analysing the effect of (iii) transparency and (iv) socio-historical variables 
on fiscal success, the analysis was restricted to the year 2014 due to data 
availability. Hence, regression analysis was performed. Two separate models were 
estimated using fiscal success (FS) as a dependent variable and variables citizens’ 
budget (CB) and war affected areas (WA) as explanatory variables.  
 
6. Empirical results 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (fiscal success) 
presented in Table 1 confirm that there are differences with respect to fiscal 
success at different levels of administrative governance. The sample of 
municipalities was classified as fiscally “liberal” in the sense that their fiscal 
success, budget balance, indicates, on average, budget deficit. On the other hand, 
the sample of counties and cities were classified as fiscally “conservative” in the 
sense of keeping their budget balance prudent in comparison to the municipalities. 
One can relate this result to the fiscal strength of the examined LGUs and the 
existing legislation, such as the Budget Act. As a fiscally centralized country, the 
Croatian central government shares its tax revenues mostly with cities and 
municipalities (e.g. income tax) which makes them fiscally much more powerful 
compared to counties [3]. Additionally, there is not much “room of for 
manoeuvring” for municipalities to use local public utility companies in order to 
circumvent legislative constraints on budget deficit and debt levels, as cities often 
do, so their fiscal success is lower [4]. 
 
 Municipalities Cities Counties 
Observations 1284 384 60 
Mean -0.9889 1.6505 1.6970 
Standard deviation 20.9215 13.2162 4.0875 
Min -234.0997 -81.0629 -12.8811 
Max 88.9671 35.1626 10.0524 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (fiscal success) for the period 
2012-2014 
 
                                                 
** OLS model produces efficient and consistent parameter estimates [9]. 
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The descriptive statistics for the economic and political determinants are presen-
ted in Table 2 and the transparency and socio-historical variables given in  
Table 3. 
 
 TAX DEBT GRANTS Ideo_l Ideo_r 
Municipalities 
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
Mean 43.7120 302.1947 20.4810 0.1635 0.6106 
Standard 
deviation 
16.0324 869.8249 17.3145 0.3700 0.4878 
Min 4.5006 0 0 0 0 
Max 84.5505 10762.85 90.4718 1 1 
Cities 
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 
Mean 49.0787 651.0762 16.1609 0.2682 0.5417 
Standard 
deviation 
12.6001 737.7886 11.8846 0.4436 0.4989 
Min 6.0323 0 0.3485 0 0 
Max 79.5710 3955.278 61.9005 1 1 
Counties 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 
Mean 42.3407 290.8588 44.3711 0.2167 0.6833 
Standard 
deviation 
15.8264 293.7089 16.4067 0.4154 0.4691 
Min 16.8692 0.0295 10.6576 0 0 
Max 79.2048 1071.111 71.1054 1 1 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for economic and political determinants for the period 
2012-2014 
 
The results from Table 2, namely the share of tax revenues in total revenues, 
indicate that, on average, all three administrative levels have less than 50% of 
their revenues stemming from taxes. Thus, confirming high fiscal centralization 
of regional and local government in Croatia as noted by [2], [3] and [23]. Data on 
debt and grants complete the picture. The highest percentage of grants in total 
revenues was recorded in counties, thus indicating their low fiscal strength. Addi-
tionally, this finding also provides one of the reasons why counties have a prudent 
fiscal stance. They do not have access to significant funds that would allow them 
to behave in a fiscally irresponsible manner. The sequence of debt for three 
administrative levels is exactly the same as is the case for grants. Namely, counties 
have the lowest level, whereas cities, fiscally the strongest local units, have the 
highest amount of debt. Political variables indicate that right wing incumbents 
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were mostly in power during the 2012-2014 period across all three administrative 
levels. 
 




CB 427 0.0094 0.0964 0 1 
WA 418 7.9707 7.7218 0 46.2921 
Cities 
CB 128 0.1484 0.3569 0 1 
WA 128 10.3670 8.9720 0.1650 64.9826 
Counties 
CB 20 0.35 0.4894 0 1 
WA 20 0.0174 0.0083 0.0038 0.0296 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for transparency and socio-historical variables for 2014 
 
As shown in Table 3, three administrative levels diverge significantly regarding 
budget transparency and war consequences. The highest percentages of war 
affected areas are recorded at the city and municipalities level, due to the fact 
that not all parts of Croatia were exposed to war. A small percentage of municipal-
lities issue citizens’ budget (CB) while the highest percentage was recorded at the 
county level. This finding has two important implications. First, low administra-
tive capacity at the municipality level indicates that municipalities have a high 
opportunity cost when it comes to publishing CBs. Second, since budget transpa-
rency is ultimately a question of political will, this is a clear sign of a lack of such 
will and disrespect towards their constituency. 
Based on the result of specification tests of the models, the following tables 
(Tables 4-6) present the results of the estimated models for the political and 
economic determinant (Table 4), for the transparency determinant (Table 5) and 
for the socio-historical determinant (Table 6).  
 

















































F  statistics 2.82 0.42 1.05
Prob > F 0.0098 0.8655 0.4023 
R-squared 0.0347 0.0042 0.1099 
Root MSE 20.603 13.293 4.0687 
Model specification tests 
F-test for 
poolability 
F(427,849) = 1.05 
Prob > F =0.2665 
F(127,249)=1.27
Prob > F =0.0539
F( 19, 34) = 1.48 
Prob > F = 0.1572 
LM test for 
random 
effects 




chibar2(01) = 0.00 
Prob>chibar2=0.49 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis;  
*, ** statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively 
Table 4: Results of the estimated model for economic and political determinants. 
 
The results of the estimated model (Table 4) enable successful identification and 
determination of factors that influence the observed differences of fiscal success at 
different levels of administrative governance. With respect to the political and 
economic determinants, a significant correlation for one economic variable, namely 
debt level of LGUs, and one interaction variable that combines political and 
economic variable was established. This interaction variable combines the level of 
grants that central government provides to LGUs with partisan “matching” 
(dummy variable that takes on the value one if the incumbents at the local and 
national level are members of the same or ideologically similar party).  
Furthermore, the obtained results indicate that there are differences among the 
LGUs in Croatia. Namely, at the county and municipality level there is a positive 
correlation between the interaction variable (GRANTS_MATCH) which 
indicates that in LGUs with lower fiscal capacities political affiliation does 
determine fiscal success. This result has serious implications due to its clear 
relationship with opportunistic political budget cycles that are already confirmed 
at the local level in Croatia [13]. The findings of this research confirm that a co-
unty or municipality is able to get scarce financial resources through grants just 
by being politically “loyal”. Considering that a significantly large part of funds 
being allocated through grants are capital expenditures that do not come under 
financing of the decentralized functions and through the fiscal equalization model, 
incumbents at the central level have enough room for discretionary movements. 
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In addition, these results are in line with the conclusions obtained in previously 
conducted researches at city and municipality levels in Croatia that also test 
political affiliation and its effect on the economic variables ([20], [21] and [22]). 
Moreover, debt level has a negative effect on fiscal success at a municipality level, 
which is as expected based on the economic theory ([20] and [23]) and existing le-
gislation [25].  
 













Observations 427 128 20
Fstatistic 3.16 0.51 0.14
Prob > F 0.0764 0.4752 0.7169 
R-squared 0.0047 0.0034 0.0076 
Root MSE 20.159 13.152 3.6828 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis;  
* denotes statistical significance at 10%,  
Table 5: Results of the estimated model for the transparency determinant. 
 
Due to the fact that there was only one observation (for 2014) for the transparency 
and socio-historical variables, their significance could not be tested in the panel 
setting, so a simple linear regression model was estimated (Table 5 and Table 6). 
The results indicate a statistically significant coefficient for municipalities for both 
the transparency and socio-historical determinant. Regarding the transparency 
determinant, the obtained results confirm the findings of Gerunov [8] that there 
is actually a negative correlation between level of transparency and fiscal success. 
However, it should be pointed out that the research performed in this paper differs 
as Gerunov [8] uses the Open Budget Index and investigates its effect on budget 
balance, primary balance and government debt across a sample of 57 countries. 
On the other hand, the indicator used in this paper involves only 1 out of 5 
indicators that are collected and investigated at the level of LGUs in Croatia ([16], 
[17] and [18]).  
 













Observations 418 128 20
Fstatistic 5.88 0.88 0.83
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Prob > F 0.0157 0.3494 0.3733
R-squared 0.0103 0.0075 0.0563
Root MSE 20.127 13.125 3.5913
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis;  
*, ** statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively 
Table 6: Results of the estimated model for the socio-historical determinant. 
 
As was the case for the transparency variable, a statistically significant coefficient 
was obtained in the sample of municipalities for the socio-historical variable (war 
affected areas) as well. The positive sign indicates two facts. First, since these 
LGUs are mostly areas of special state concern (ASSC), tax and other public 
policies favour them in the sense of tax subsidies, faster administrative procedures 
etc. Furthermore, the population in these areas aspire for their communities to 
return to a previous level of quality in terms of living (e.g. the level of infrastru-
cture). Based on that, major infrastructural investments are carried out by the 





The empirical analysis performed in the paper has confirmed that there are 
differences in fiscal success at different levels of administrative governance. The 
municipality group has been classified as fiscally “liberal”, whereas counties and 
cities have been classified as fiscally “conservative” in regard to their budget 
balance. Institutional constraints (i.e. the Budget Act and legal constraints on the 
level of deficit and debt that do not take into account indebtedness of local public 
utility companies) and fiscal strength of LGUs are primary reasons for these 
circumstances. Furthermore, the obtained results indicate that these differences 
among the LGUs in Croatia have an economic and political origin. Moreover, the 
paper confirms that the observed determinants are present at the county and 
municipality levels, whereas no significant effects were reported at the city level. 
Namely, at the county and municipality levels, there is a positive correlation 
between fiscal success and the interaction variable which combines the share of 
grants in total revenue and the political affiliation at the local and central 
government level. This result points out that in LGUs with lower fiscal capacities, 
political affiliation determines fiscal success. In other words, ideology does matter. 
This is in line with previous research relating to political influence on LGUs 
budget outcomes ([20] and [13]) and inadequate local and regional administration 
in Croatia ([12] and [14]). At the municipality level, the results indicate a negative 
correlation between the level of debt and fiscal success, which is in accordance 
with economic theory and existing legislation [25].  
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With respect to the transparency and socio-historical determinants, the performed 
analysis points to a negative effect of the citizens’ budget and a positive effect of 
war affected areas on fiscal success. These results are surprising because the theory 
suggests that higher levels of budget transparency would result in higher interest 
in the fiscal stance of the local and regional government by constituency (i.e. 
better budget surplus or balanced budget). Second, intuitively, we would expect 
that voters do not pay attention to fiscal outcomes and economic theory of voting 
in those areas which open a lot of “room for manoeuvring” for incumbents with 
respect to fiscal prudency. Therefore, future research should include a more 
encompassing budget transparency indicator which may provide a correction for 
the existing limitations of this study (one transparency indicator in only one year). 
The Institute of Public Finance collects and publishes OLBI (open local budget 
index) that, besides the citizens’ budget, includes four additional budget 
documents and covers all regional and local units (in 2015 and 2016)††. Another 
limitation of this study is that it uses only one socio-historical variable – war 
affected areas. Further research should include the level of education of 
inhabitants in respective local and regional units, various gender and age cohorts, 
and level of information literacy. Also, with respect to the used socio-historical 
determinant, variable war affected areas could be re-calculated based on the 2011 
census in order to check the robustness of obtained results and additional intera-
ction variables could be created (e.g. areas closer to the coast vs. areas in conti-
nental Croatia) to see whether there are some other determinants that might 
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